Marquette Law Review
Volume 23
Issue 2 February 1939

Article 2

Sequestration for the Benefit of Creditors
L. L. Rieselbach

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
L. L. Rieselbach, Sequestration for the Benefit of Creditors, 23 Marq. L. Rev. 59 (1939).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol23/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

SEQUESTRATION FOR THE BENEFIT
OF CREDITORS
L. L.

T

RIESELBACII

INTRODUCTION

HE liquidation of the estates of debtors demands the attention of
commercial interests at any period of financial stringency. The collapse of 1929 and the vastly changed conditions thereafter emphasized
the inadequacy of existing regulations. Proposals for the amendment
of the system of bankruptcy flooded Congress during_ the Hoover
administration and thereafter, culminating in the enactment of the socalled Chandler amendments effective in September, 1938. In administration for a distribution under the state forum there were no changes
proposed or enacted during the comparable period until July, 1937,
when the new Chapter 128 of the Wisconsin Statutes became operative.
At common law there existed no reason why one creditor should not
satisfy a debtor's obligation to him even though at the expense of other
creditors. The vigilant, aggressive or favored creditor, with or without
the cooperation of his debtor, might obtain a preference leaving no
redress to other creditors. In juxtaposition to this theory is the principle of equitable distribution as repeated from time to time in the
application of bankruptcy laws, creditors' bills and representative suits.
Statutes embodying the maxim that equality is equity have been devised
and enacted from time to time to meet changing circumstances.
Chapter 128 of the Wisconsin Statutes is that portion of the section
of the statutes devoted to regulation of trade which is identified as
"Creditors' Actions." Its enactment in 1937 was the outgrowth of feeling of attorneys handling liquidations that legislative correction was
needed to eliminate the inconsistencies and glaring inadequacies of the
then existing state law.
At that time Chapter 128 related solely to voluntary assignments.
It was a development of two portions of the Wisconsin Statutes. One
was a part of the section under "Regulation of Trade" and entitled
"Voluntary Assignments," and the other a separate chapter which provided for the obtaining of a discharge by the debtor from his debts and
obligations. These two chapters were wedded in the old Chapter 128.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court In the Matter of the Voluntary Assignment of Tarnowski' decided that the sections were mismated and
declared the discharge feature to be unconstitutional as contravening
rights delegated exclusively to the federal Congress.
1191 Wis. 279, 210 N.W. 836 (1926).
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The remainder of the statute was regarded by most attorneys as
impractical. Few assignments were placed under the supervision of the
circuit courts as intended by the law. Most of them were handled arbitrarily by an assignee selected by the debtor or insisted upon by his
creditors. The game was often played without rules or limited solely
by the terms of the instrument of assignment itself and subjected to
numerous obvious inequities and abuses. The old statute contained
some provisions for involuntary control of assets but the procedure
was seldom used.
In addition to voluntary assignment the estate of a debtor could
have been sequestered, where such debtor was a corporation, by a petition to the court either as a separate action or supplemental to a circuit
court judgment after an execution upon such judgment was returned
unsatisfied.2 The courts held that the creditors were entitled to this
remedy as a matter of right. This proceeding, however, although the
subject of the equivalent of a textbook in Harringtonv. Gilchrist,3 left
the administration almost entirely to the discretion of the receiver subject to the remote control of the Court.
A scrutiny of the law prior to the enactment of the 1937 version of
Chapter 128 disclosed the following deficiencies which it was believed
should be corrected.
1. The old Chapter 128 contained useless or unconstitutional provisions.
2. The title, power and authority of the receiver and assignee
were too limited.
3. There existed no right of recovery by the receiver of property
transferred as a preference; and in the case of an assignee, the right
was too closely restricted as to time.
4. Liens void under the national Bankruptcy Act were valid in
state court proceedings.
5. Distribution under state court proceedings upon the appointment of a receiver varied from the distribution upon a voluntary
assignment, and both placed the wage earner under a disadvantage in
comparison with the federal bankruptcy system.4
6. Secured creditors were not required to offset their security in
order to determine the amount upon which they could obtain a dividend, but they were entitled to a dividend upon the full amount of their
claim.
The financial debacle of 1929 focused attention on these several
handicaps. As a result legislation was repeatedly suggested and ulti2WIs.

STAT.

(1935) § 268.16(7).

121 Wis. 127, 99 N.W. 909 (1904).
4 Cf. Bankruptcy Act % 56b, 51e, 11 U.S.C.A. § 92, 11 U.S.C.A. § 79.
5 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 57h, 11 U.S.C.A. § 93.
3
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mately fostered to eliminate the objections and to give to a state court
functionary, whether receiver or assignee, weapons to prevent preferences to or grabbing by aggressive creditors.
AFTER AMENDMENT

The law was amended to furnish the mechanics to accomplish the
efficient collection, administration and equitable distribution to creditors entitled to share in them of the assets of the debtor. No attempt
was made to provide him a discharge from his obligations or to permit
the composition, scaling down by reorganization, or otherwise reducing
the claims of creditors against the debtor. It does attempt to facilitate
gathering the assets and distributing them.
There is little in the law itself that is new. The better and more
practical features of the old Chapter 128 were re-enacted. For the balance of the chapter, the national Bankruptcy Act was taken as a guide
and where it was practicable, the language of the Bankruptcy Act was
embodied in the chapter. In most cases arising under the act, precedents
will be found either in decisions under the old Chapter 128 or under
the Bankruptcy Act. Any attempt to determine the intent of the present chapter will be simplified by comparison with the parallel section
in the Bankruptcy Act. There are in most cases ample annotations and
authority for interpretation and application.
INVOLUNTARY PROCEEDINGS

In all cases except where the proceeding is supplementary to a Circuit Court judgment, the proceedings are begun by the issuance of a
summons. The petition serves as the bill of complaint in equity. The
statutory requirements should be pleaded to give the court jurisdiction.
It is customary to issue an order at the same time requiring the debtor
to show cause why a received should not be appointed forthwith, so
that the assets of the debtor will not be dissipated during the time for
answer. Where there is no contest, the order upon the proceeding to
show cause is often accepted as an adequate and proper course of
administration. The recommended practice is to obtain a further sufficient order after the expiration of the statutory time for answer.
After the appointment of a receiver or the designation of an
assignee for the benefit of creditors in voluntary proceedings, the
course of the liquidation becomes uniform. The former distinctions as
to title (with one possible exceptionS), rights and distribution have
been eliminated.
Under Chapter 128.06.7 a petition may be filed against an insolvent
debtor whenever the debtor shall have (1) Conveyed, transferred, or
eWls. STAT. (1937) § 128.19(1,b).
" Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 3a, 11 U.S.C.A. § 21.
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removed his property with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors, (2) Made a transfer with intent to prefer creditors, or (3) Permitted or suffered, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference
through legal proceedings. Instead of the bankruptcy requirement of
three creditors having claims totaling $500.00, the state law requires
that there need be but two creditors with claims totaling not less than
$200.00. There is no minimum requirement as to the total indebtedness
of the debtor as is required by the Bankruptcy Act. Under this procedure, the claim need not be reduced to judgment. The validity of the
claims must be determined as challenged in the involuntary proceeding.
Subsection (2) of 128.06 Wis. Stat. (1937)8 requires the debtor, where
he denies the insolvency or opposes the petition, to appear in Court at
the time set for hearing with his books and records. Upon his failure
to produce such records as will make the information available to the
petitioners, there falls upon him the burden of proving himself solvent.
Subsection (3) provides for a prompt hearing and permits the intervention of other creditors.
Note should be made of Subsection (4). Formerly, where an assignment was made by the debtor, it was often the practice for the assignee
to execute his trust without any court supervision. The method of
requiring the filing of the assignment and the supervision of the court
has been simplified by this section." Any one creditor may, upon proof
of the making of the assignment, require the assignor to file the assignment and comply with the provisions of this chapter as to both procedure and distribution. It has been the practice in some localities to
create preferences in the assignment so that distribution under the deed
of trust would be different from that provided for in the chapter. Upon
filing of the assignment, either voluntary or upon petition, it is believed
the provisions of the chapter as to distribution will govern 0 despite
provisions in the contract of assignment to the contrary3n
Where the debtor is a corporation, in addition to the proceedings by
petition referred to above, Section 128.08 provides that one creditor,
who has reduced his claim to judgment and issued an execution which
has been returned unsatisfied, can, upon a showing of the facts, obtain
appointment of a receiver to sequester and liquidate the assets of the
corporation. This may be done by the commencement of a separate
proceeding or, if the judgment is a Circuit Court judgment, by a bill
supplementary to judgment. This section incorporates the provision of
8 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 3d, 11 U.S.C.A. § 21.

9 Mayfield Mills v. Goodrich & Martineau Co., 189 Wis. 406, 207 N.W. 954
(1926).
10 Wis. STAT. (1937) § 128.02(2) ; Pobreslo v. Boyd Co., 210 Wis. 472, 242 N.W.
725 (1932).
"See Gilbert Paper Co. v. Whiting Paper Co., 123 Wis. 472, 102 N.W. 20 (1905)
overruling Duryea v. Muse, 117 Wis. 399, 94 N.W. 365 (1903).
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what was, in 1935, Chapter 268.16(7) of the Wisconsin Statutes, and
prior to that time Chapter 286.10. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Hazelwood v. Third & Wells Company'2 held that courts of equity have
the inherent power to appoint receivers for insolvent corporations and
that this power was not suspended by the Bankruptcy Act.
LIENS AND TITLE OF TRUSTEE

Upon the appointment of a receiver in involuntary proceedings or
upon the filing of an assignment in voluntary proceedings, Section
128.19 provides that the assignee or trustee, as the case may be, takes
the title of the debtor except to exempt property including the following:
A. Property transferred in fraud of his creditors.
B. Property which, prior to the filing of the petition, he could by
any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon or
sold under judicial process against him,"3 as well as
C. Rights of action upon contract for damages.24
These provisions are taken from the federal Bankruptcy Act, Section 70a. Although the reference in both the Bankruptcy Act and the
state act is to the title of the debtor, the additional provisions constitute
a substantial enlargement of the debtor's title. The various subsections
have been the subject of numerous decisions of the federal and state
courts interpreting the bankruptcy sections. Such decisions will probably control as to the interpretation of the state act.
Prior to the enactment of this statute, the title of the receiver or
assignee was limited strictly to the title of the debtor. As a consequence,
unrecorded liens or liens on which the period of record expired were
valid as against the receiver and other creditors, although prior to the
commencement of liquidation proceedings other creditors might have
levied or attached. This was the holding in the case of Milwaukee Tank
Works v. Sadlier, in which the Court said, "The possession of the
receiver is only that of the Court whose officer he is, and adds nothing
to the previously existing title of the mortgagor."
It should be noted that the additional title of an assignee under
voluntary proceedings is vested at the time of the filing of the assignment, not as of the time of the making of the assignment.' It is felt
that despite provisions of Section 128.02, which permit the Court to
amend any assignment so as to obtain a fair and equitable distribution,
the voluntary assignee may be taking considerable risk in not filing
205 Wis. 85, 236 N.W. 591 (1931).
13 Bankruptcy Act § 7 0a(5), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110.
14 Bankruptcy Act § 70a(6), 11 U.S.C.A. § 110.
'5191 Wis. 233, 210 N.W. 694 (1926).
'- WIs. STAT. (1937) § 128.19(1,b).
12
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his assignment promptly. In other words this section, apparently, permits the possibility of a creditor perfecting a lien otherwise rendered
invalid between the time of appointment and time of the filing of the
assignment if that filing is delayed.
The title of the receiver or assignee is further enlarged by subsection (2) of Section 128.19.17 This places the receiver inthe position of
the most favored creditor and is taken almost verbatim from Section
70e of the Bankruptcy Act. It permits the receiver or assignee to avoid
any transfer by the debtor of his property which any creditor might
have avoided. The bankruptcy provision from which this has been
adapted has been passed on by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the
case of Sparks v. Kuss'38 and by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
7th Circuit in the case of In re Baumgartner'* arising out of the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
Section 128.19 should be read in conjunction with Section 128.18
covering the validity of liens. The latter provides at Subdivision (1)
that liens which, for want of record or for other reasons, would not
have been valid liens against creditors of the debtor armed with process, shall not be liens against the estate. It was intended that the phrase
"armed with process" be interpreted to mean armed with process by
virtue of which property has been seized. This was based upon definitions given in Graham v. Perry,0 and certain Federal decisions cited
therein. Since, apparently, the courts are having difficulty with the
interpretation of the section, it might be well to amend the phrase to
state plainly "armed with process by which the property has been
seized."
In addition thereto, the receiver or assignee is again placed in the
position of the most favored creditor in being subrogated to the rights
of any creditor who is prevented from enforcing his rights as against
a lien created or attempted to be created by the debtor-' The phraseology was drawn from Section 67b of the Bankruptcy Act and should
be read in conjunction with Section 47a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 128.18 also permits the receiver or assignee to set aside liens
which would create a preference or were given to hinder, delay or
defraud creditors. It preserves the rights of creditors who obtained
liens in good faith and for an adequate, valuable consideration.
Transfers made or given within four months prior to the proceedings while the debtor is insolvent, for a pre-existing indebtedness, are
declared void as preferential. Much of the language is that of the old
'1 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 70, 11 U.S.C.A. § 110.
's 195 Wis. 378, 216 N.W.
1955 F. (2d) 1041 (1931).

20

929 (1928).

200 Wis. 211, 228 N.W. 135 (1929).

21 In re Baumgartner, 55 F. (2d) 1041 (1931).
22

Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U.S. 642, 36 Sup. Ct. 466, 60 L.ed.
841 (1916).
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Bankruptcy Act. Cases decided under Section 67 of the Act are regarded as controlling for the most part. It should be noted, however,
that the state act goes farther than the Bankruptcy Act in that where
a lien is proven to be preferential, it does not require that the creditors
have reasonable causes to believe that the transferor was insolvent.2
The sections on the title of the receiver and on liens and preferences are intended to give to the receiver or assignee all of the property
rights which a trustee in bankruptcy receives. This should successfully
prevent an inequitable disposition of assets where bankruptcy is not
available to the creditors. It will enable creditors to recover without
entailing a duplicate expense by filing a petition in bankruptcy where
the debtor has made a voluntary assignment or a receiver has been
appointed in Circuit Court.
The provisions as to the. setting aside of the preferences are under
the section on liens. This is deemed proper since a preference is always
an attempted transfer of title which the recipient endeavors to set up
as against other creditors.
ADMINISTRATION

After a receiver has been appointed or an assignee been designated,
an efficient and expeditious administration has been provided for. The
debtor is required by Statute to file a statement of assets and a list of
creditors7 comparable to schedules in bankruptcy. The receiver is then
required to send a notice of the pendency of the proceedings to all
creditors to permit them to file their claims. He is also required to publish notice of the pendency of the proceedings.
The time for filing claims under the state law has been reduced to
three months.26 It was felt that under the modem system of commercial practice ample time was given by those provisions, and that the
bankruptcy provisions permitting six months for filing of claims was a
vestige of an earlier day when the speed of communications was much
more limited. Thus, the period of administration is curtailed and distribution is made possible within a period of time three months shorter
than through bankruptcy proceedings.
Provisions are made for the proof of claims and the objections
thereto either by the receiver or by creditors.Y
Creditors have repeatedly complained that the administration of any
liquidation takes far too long. In order to expedite such administration,
every receiver or assignee is required by Section 128.20 to file with the
Court, within six months after the time limited for filing claims, a full
(1937)
(1937)
STAT. (1937)
2-WIs.
6
Bankruptcy Act §
-Wis. STAT. (1937)
=Wis.

-Wis.

STAT.
STAT.

§ 128.18(6).

§ 128.13.
§ 128.14(1).
57, 11 U.S.C.A. § 93.
§ 128.15.
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accounting. If any receiver or assignee neglects to apply promptly for a
settlement of his account, the Court may, upon the request of any
creditor, compel the making of a final account, and the receiver or
assignee may be denied compensation.
The trustee or assignee is compelled to collect and liquidate the
assets during this limited period. If litigation is pending when the time
has elapsed he is permitted to obtain an extension of his administration. If he believes that assets have been concealed or transferred in
violation of the provisions of Chapter 128 or Chapters 240 to 242 applying to fraudulent transfers, he may compel the debtor to submit to
examination as provided for in Section 128.16, and to disclose the circumstances surrounding the disposition of his property and the consideration therefor. All officers, agents or stockholders of a corporation, and all persons to whom it is alleged that a transfer has been
made, may be compelled to testify.
DISTRIBUTION

The question of distribution left much to be desired prior to the
enactment of Chapter 128. In cases of voluntary assignment, there
might have been preferences or priorities granted by the contract establishing the trust. The legislature had previously attempted to establish
some sort of a priority for wages. Under a voluntary assignment, however, there was one provision, and under the receivership section,
Chapter 268, a different provision was applicable. Under Chapter 286
dealing with the sequestration of insolvent corporations, a third provision existed. In all three instances the payment of wages was formerly subordinated to the payment of taxes, both federal and state.
The Bankruptcy Act, on the other hand, established wages as prior
to taxes. For the sake of uniformity, Section 128.17 adopts the same
order of distribution and provides for the payment of wages earned
within three months prior to the commencement of the proceedings,
and not to exceed $600.00, to a claimant immediately after the payment
of the necessary costs of preserving the estate and the cost of the
administration. Taxes, both state and federal, constitute the next
group of priorities.
A peculiar situation may have arisen by the enactment of this provision for distribution. Federal tax legislation gives priority to taxes
due to the United States over everything except the cost of administration. The system of bankruptcy, however, places wages ahead of taxes.
The provision in a state system of distribution may be unconstitutional
in attempting to abrogate the priority given by federal tax legislation
even though it copies, word for word, the federal Bankruptcy Act.
28

Bankruptcy Act § 64, 11 U.S.C.A. § 104.
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Whether this legislation is unconstitutional or not, no cases have been
noted where the federal government has attempted to claim a priority
over wages.
In the provision on taxes, taxes and assessments due the United
States and the state are included in the same subdivision. The federal
government insists that it is entitled to a priority over the various state
taxing agencies, and this contention has been upheld in our Circuit
Court.
Formerly, attorneys representing judgment creditors against corporations sometimes availed themselves of the statute providing for
sequestration for the sole purpose of obtaining payment of the judgment plus costs, and including, if allowed, an attorney's fee. They would
issue a summons and complaint and an order to show cause and obtain
the designation of a receiver. Upon being paid off, no further steps
would be taken in the sequestration proceedings, or the action would be
dismissed. The use of the proceedings merely as a club is limited by
Section 128.12, which provides that after the designation of a receiver
or custodian, proceedings cannot be dismissed for want of prosecution
or by consent until after notice has been sent all creditors. The Court,
before considering an application for dismissal, requires the debtor to
file a list of creditors to whom such notices are sent advising the
date for the hearing of the petition for dismissal. In other words,
this section will not permit the use of the chapter's provisions to circumvent its purpose and to allow one creditor to obtain a preference.
ADVANTAGES OF THE STATE ACT

It is believed that the system of administration provided affords a
more facile means of liquidation in some instances than the bankruptcy
proceedings. The terms of Chapter 128 probably are more flexible than
the Bankruptcy Act. A creditor who has failed to file a claim within
the time limited may for cause shown be permitted at a subsequent time
to present his proof and to participate in the dividend. A sale of the
property can be held in a shorter time. The receiver or assignee may,
by Court order, be permitted to operate the business until the time of
sale, filling orders on hand, completing contracts or taking advantage of
opportunities to increase the net proceeds.
Under the practice prevailing in the United States District Court
for this district, a receiver or trustee is not permitted to operate the
business of the bankrupt. It was felt that this at times worked a hardship upon the creditors, for by operation during the limited time required for the sending of notice of sale there could be obtained a higher
price for the assets as a going business. The uninterrupted operation
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in a great many cases has carried with it a goodwill value which
increases the proceeds to creditors.
As we have noted before, a simple unlitigated matter can be closed
in about half the time of the federal minimum.
CONSTITUTIONALITY

The question of the constitutionality of the entire legislation has
been raised from time to time upon the accepted theory that only the
federal government may establish, maintain and enforce a system of
bankruptcy. The answer to this broad objection is simply that no effort
has been made to create or maintain a bankruptcy or insolvency law.
Its primary purpose is to permit liquidation for the benefit of creditors
under state jurisdiction. It affords no discharge to the debtor of his
obligations and no voluntary proceeding by the debtor is effective to
alter the debtor-creditor relationship without the consent of the creditors. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has intimated that no matter what
the nature of the proceeding provided for, a statute will not be held to
be an insolvency law unless it provides for the discharge of the debtor.
The following quotation is from In re Tarnowski :
"The winding up and a fair and equal distribution of the
estate of insolvent debtors may arise in various ways, but where
such a proceeding does not result in the discharge of the insolvent debtor, state statutes regulating such proceedings do not
conflict in any manner with the bankruptcy law."
The sole purpose of the state act is the administration of assets
belonging to or which should properly belong to the debtor. In other
words, it is not sought to affect the creditor's rights against his debtor
or to afford the debtor any privilege of disposing of his debts in the
absence of a contract with his creditors by which they consent to discharge him of his obligations. The chapter operates upon the res and
not upon the status of the parties.
The right to make a voluntary assignment of assets for the benefit
of creditors is a common law one. It has been repeatedly upheld by
the United States Supreme Court. One of the leading cases on the
subject is Porbreslo v. Boyd Co., ° which includes a comprehensive
discussion and citation of authority. The right of the state to regulate
liquidation after a voluntary assignment is supported by the United
States Supreme Court in the affirming opinion. The state court in its
decision followed its own line of cases, prominent in which is the case
29 191 Wis. 279, 285, 210 N.W. 836, 838 (1926).
30 210 Wis. 20, 242 N.W. 725 (1932) affirmed in 287 U.S. 518, 53 Sup. Ct. 262,
77 L.ed. 469 (1933).
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of Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Goodrich & Martineau.3The case of
Johnson v. Star,2 and Pobreslo v. Boyd- both decided in 1933, hold
that the United States Supreme Court will follow the state court's
interpretation of its own statutes.
The leading case declaring a state system of insolvency as unconstitutional is InternationalChoe Co. v. Pinkus,3 in which Justices Brandeis, McReynolds and Sanford dissent. It seems that this case is clearly
distinguishable and that the rule set forth in Stellwagen v. Clum is.
more likely to be applied if the act is tested. The Court there said:
"It is only state laws which conflict with the bankruptcy laws
of Congress that are suspended; those which are in aid of the
Bankruptcy Act can stand."
This was quoted with approval in In re McElwain.3 6
The right of a state to regulate generally the disposition of assets
of a corporation of its creation has not been successfully challenged.
It is believed that as a general plan of liquidation, the chapter is constitutional. There is an interesting article dealing with the constitutionality of the chapter in the Wisconsin Law Review.- In the final analysis, since the equity jurisdiction of the courts under a creditors' bill is
conceded, the enactment of regulatory provisions is not an unwarranted
enlargement of that jurisdiction.
CHANDLER ACT

When the bill for liquidations and distribution through the state
courts was being drawn, it was known that recommendations to Congress had been made from time to time for the amendment of the
Bankruptcy Act. Other than emergency legislation in the field of
reorganization, amendments had been few and it was thought best not
to wait for any amendment of the Bankruptcy Act. The unexpected,
however, happened and the Chandler Act was passed effective September, 1938, giving the federal system a thorough and needed revision.
The substance of the old Bankruptcy Act has been changed in some
respects but most of the provisions of the state act still conform to the
federal law. An interesting example of what has happened, however,
can be stated briefly. The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act prescribed
the duties of the Trustees at Section 47a (2), and the trustee was there
directed to reduce to possession assets of the estate. In order to do so,
he was given the power of a creditor holding a lien by legal proceed3 189 Wis. 406, 209 N.W. 602 (1926).
32 287 U.S. 527, 53 Sup. Ct. 265, 77 L.ed. 473 (1933).
33 Supra note 30.

34 278 U.S. 261, 49 Sup. Ct. 108, 73 L.ed. 318 (1929).
3 245 U.S. 605, 615, 38 Sup Ct. 215, 218, 62 L.ed. 507, 512 (1918).
36296 Fed. 112 (1924).
1938 Wis. L. R. 302.
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ings. It was felt in drawing the state act that this properly belonged
under the section of liens which is Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act.
The sponsors of the Bankruptcy Act in drawing the Chandler bill felt
that this should properly be included under Section 70, for it deals with
the title of the trustee. Since the interpretation of the provision has
been the subject of a great many decisions, it is felt that the purpose of
the provision is now clear regardless of whether it is included in the
section of liens or that of title.
Upon the suggestion of Dean Garrison of the Wisconsin Law
School, there was added to the bill as it was originally proposed by the
Committee on Bankruptcies and Receiverships, the section for the
amortization of the debts of wage earners. This provides in brief for a
plan of payment whereby the debts of a wage earner may be paid in
full over a period of two years during which time his wages will be
free from garnishment and his assets from levy. A plan of this nature
has subsequently been enacted as Chapter XIII of the Chandler Act
and is now a part of the bankruptcy system of the United States.
CONCLUSION

The new Chapter 128 has been in operation a little more than a
year. During that time, a great many interesting questions have arisen
as to the title of the Trustee, the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain
questions of liens in summary proceedings, the priorities of taxes, and
the interpretation of the lien section as to present and fair consideration. In most instances the courts have followed the precedents established by the Bankruptcy Act and the obvious intent of the state bill.
This purpose of course is to obtain an equitable distribution of the
assets of any insolvent debtor, and to prevent any creditor, by reason
of vigilance, inside information or the friendship of the debtor, from
obtaining the lion's share.
There are many changes which may or should be made to clear up
ambiguities or inconsistencies. For the most part, it is submitted that
the law serves its purpose of furnishing to creditors a fair, workable,
expeditious method of collection and distribution of a debtor's available
assets.

